

I. Course title: Safety Assessment for Aircraft Systems

I.1 Course Introduction

This course has been designed by the author of Aircraft System Safety: Military and Civil Aeronautical Applications (Woodhead Publishing Ltd, Cambridge, 2005) and will also use material from his manuscript (to be published in 2013) entitled Aircraft Failure Assessments: A practical guide for System Safety

The course material is mature and has, since 2006, been presented to Marshall Aerospace (Cambridge), Cranfield University (UK), BAE Systems (Australia), Civilian Operators in Singapore & Hong Kong, and various air forces (e.g. SAAF, RAF and RAAF) who have needed to understand the civil approach to Aircraft System Safety Assessments.

I.2 Course learning objectives

- ▶ Introduction to Safety Assessment of Complex Systems
- ▶ Functional hazard assessment
- ▶ Probability calculations
- ▶ Reliability of systems and equipment
- ▶ Common cause failures
- ▶ Particular risks and zonal safety analysis
- ▶ Fault tree analysis
- ▶ Failure mode and effect analysis (theory/practice)
- ▶ Evaluation of in service aircraft and equipment and risk management

I.3 Course duration

- ▶ 3-days

I.4 Special Requirements of Course Participants

- ▶ An understanding of CS25 and ICAO SMS Manual (Doc 9859) would be a distinct advantage although not essential.

1.5 Special Requirements of Course

- ▶ NIL

1.6 Assessment Process

- ▶ This will be overall and continuous, against the course objectives. We also offer a multiple choice examination paper for in-house courses, at EASA's request.

1.7 Course Trainers

Primary Facilitator Mr. Duane Kritzinger

2. Technical specifications and training plan

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The regulatory framework/environment on which this course is based:

- ▶ CS25.1309
- ▶ SAE ARP4754
- ▶ ICAO SMS Manual (Doc 9859)

Outline learning objectives

Supporting documentation, materials and training aids

Outline learning objectives

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|---|----------------------------|
| ▶ Introduction to Safety Assessment of Complex Systems | ▶ Modules 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 |
| ▶ Functional hazard assessment | ▶ Module 3.1 |
| ▶ Probability calculations | ▶ Modules 2.1, 2.3 and 3.2 |
| ▶ Reliability of systems and equipment | ▶ Module 3.2 |
| ▶ Common cause failures | ▶ Module 3.4 |
| ▶ Particular risks and zonal safety analysis | ▶ Modules 3.5 and 3.6 |
| ▶ Fault tree analysis | ▶ Modules 2.1 and 3.3 |
| ▶ Failure mode and effect analysis (theory/practice) | ▶ Module 3.7 |
| ▶ Evaluation of in service aircraft and equipment and risk management | ▶ Module 1.1 and 1.3 |

Course introduction

Understand course objectives and methodology; what do we want the attendee to be able to do and understand following this training course?

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| ▶ Course structure | ▶ Throughout the whole training course PowerPoint presentation and projection equipment is utilised as well as flipcharts to capture thoughts and illustrate key points. |
| ▶ Methodology | ▶ Handouts and case study materials are passed to the attendee such that they |
| ▶ Course learning objectives/personal learning objectives | |

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can read, discuss, take notes and retain for review at a later date.

Module 1.1: Risk Management in the Safety Management System

- ▶ History & Purpose (through-life safety)
- ▶ Safety Criteria used (risk based approach)
- ▶ Safety Case Components
- ▶ SMS
- ▶ Safety Argument (in Goal Structured Notation)
- ▶ Hazard Log
- ▶ Hazards and Accidence
- ▶ Accident video and group exercise
- ▶ This module addresses, (via real world case studies) the background that led to establishment of Safety Management Systems
- ▶ Supports Ch 4, 6 & 9 of Aircraft System Safety: Military and Civil Aeronautical Applications

Module 1.2: The System Safety Assessment Process

- ▶ History & Purpose (design safety)
- ▶ Safety Criteria used (goal based approach of CS25.1309)
- ▶ Regulatory Requirements and Guidance Material
- ▶ Understanding the System Hierarchy
- ▶ Safety Strategy/Argument and benefits of Goal Structured Notation)
- ▶ Safety Assessment Procedure(from Concept to Certification)
- ▶ This module addresses, (via real world case studies) the CS25.1309 approach to Safety Assessment of Aircraft Systems
- ▶ Supports Ch 5 & 8 of Aircraft System Safety: Military and Civil Aeronautical Applications

Module 1.3: Relating the 25.1309 Criteria to the SMS Risk Criteria

- ▶ History & Purpose (design safety)
- ▶ Safety Criteria used (goal based approach of CS25.1309)
- ▶ Regulatory Requirements and Guidance Material
- ▶ Understanding the System Hierarchy
- ▶ Safety Strategy/Argument and benefits of Goal Structured Notation)
- ▶ Safety Assessment Procedure(from Concept to Certification)
- ▶ Integrates the approaches in Modules 1 & 2
- ▶ This module addresses the EASA requirement for “Evaluation of in service aircraft and equipment and risk management”

Module 2.1: Failure Probability estimation in Avionic Systems

- ▶ Apply Safety Criteria to a typical avionic modification.
- ▶ From the failure severity, deduce a safety target and show what is involved in meeting that target (via FTA case study of Primary Flight Display failure scenario)
- ▶ Demonstrates how the SSA improves/influences the design (in terms of functional performance and diagnostics)

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Module 2.2: Misleading Avionics

- ▶ Explore the safety effects of misleading instruments.
- ▶ Show how the Safety Assessment can assist in fault diagnostics and generation of Flight Reference Cards.
- ▶ Accident video and discussion
- ▶ This presentation is 5 years old, but the case study is very topical as it discusses pilot KB static failures

Module 2.3: Failure Probability estimation in Mechanical Systems

- ▶ Link structural integrity to the System Safety Assessment.
- ▶ Prove safety target accomplishment for mechanical systems (qualitative vs. quantitative).
- ▶ Maintenance philosophy vs. Safety
- ▶ Introduce "Fail Safe" Concept.
- ▶ Show how the Safety Assessment influences/relies on maintenance procedures
- ▶ Accident video and discussion
- ▶ Supports Ch 7 & 10 of Aircraft System Safety: Military and Civil Aeronautical Applications

Module 3.1: Functional Hazard Analysis

- ▶ Introduction and use of the FHA and its part in the product lifecycle.
- ▶ FHA objectives
- ▶ Simple process
- ▶ An FHA model (tailored from SAE ARP4761)
- ▶ Advantages and limitations
- ▶ Supports Ch 3 in Aircraft Failure Assessments: A practical guide for System Safety.

Module 3.2: Failure Probability Theory

- ▶ Background to quantitative probability assessment
- ▶ Symbols commonly used
- ▶ Probability Fundamentals
- ▶ MTBF and Failure Rates
- ▶ Combining Events
- ▶ Class Assignment
- ▶ System Architectures
- ▶ Class Assignment
- ▶ This module addresses the EASA requirement for "Reliability of systems and equipment"

Module 3.3: Fault Tree Analysis

- ▶ Purpose
- ▶ Notation
- ▶ Supports Ch 4 in Aircraft Failure Assessments: A practical guide for System Safety.

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- ▶ Boolean Logic
- ▶ Advantages and Limitations

Module 3.4: Common Cause Analysis

- ▶ Purpose
- ▶ Systemic vs Random failures
- ▶ Methodology (tailored from SAE ARP4761)
- ▶ Advantages and limitations
- ▶ Supports Ch 5 in Aircraft Failure Assessments: A practical guide for System Safety.
- ▶ This module addresses the EASA requirement for “Common Cause Analysis”

Module 3.5: Particular Risk Analysis

- ▶ Purpose
- ▶ Methodology (tailored from SAE ARP4761)
- ▶ Advantages and limitations
- ▶ Supports Ch 6 in Aircraft Failure Assessments: A practical guide for System Safety.
- ▶ This module addresses the EASA requirement for “Particular Risk Analysis”

Module 3.6: Zonal Safety Analysis

- ▶ Purpose
- ▶ Methodology (tailored from SAE ARP4761)
- ▶ Example
- ▶ Advantages and limitations
- ▶ Supports Ch 7 in Aircraft Failure Assessments: A practical guide for System Safety.
- ▶ This module addresses the EASA requirement for Zonal Safety Analysis

Module 3.7: FMEA, FMECA & FMES

- ▶ Purpose and distinction in FMEA, FMECA and FMES
- ▶ Safety Argument and how the FMEA relates
- ▶ Process
- ▶ Approaches at System Level 2, 3 & 4
- ▶ Example
- ▶ Advantages & Limitations
- ▶ Supports Ch87 in Aircraft Failure Assessments: A practical guide for System Safety.
- ▶ This module addresses the EASA requirement for “Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (theory/practice)”