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EASA issues CRD 2014-02: Specific risk and standardised criteria for conducting aeroplane-level saf

This Comment-Response Document (CRD) contains the comments received on Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2014-02 (published on 27 January 2014) and the responses provided to them by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). It also contains the draft resulting CS-25 text. Compared to the NPA 2014-02 proposal, several changes have been made to the proposed CS/AMC 25.1309 (system safety assessment) and CS/AMC 25.671 (flight control systems) to clarify various elements based on the comments received while keeping the main elements of the NPA proposal. Some provisions have also been added to address controllability during ditching with no engine power. Concerning the changes to the domain of structure, the proposed amendments to CS 25.629(b), AMC 25.629 and Appendix K are withdrawn; however, the proposed amendments to CS 25.629(d) are maintained. Finally, the proposed amendments concerning reversing systems in CS/AMC 25.933 are maintained. Stakeholders are invited to review the draft resulting text (Appendix B) and provide their reactions, if any. EASA will then prepare the next amendment of CS-25, taking into account the reactions received, if any.


RTCA Is No Longer an FAA Advisory Committee

Work Largely Continues as Group Becomes a Standards Development Organization

RTCA, which for decades has developed standards and worked through technical challenges at the behest of the Federal Aviation Administration, is no longer a Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) for the agency.

The FAA declined to renew its contract with RTCA and will instead take over some of what RTCA was doing - though, for now, the changes will be limited.

RTCA is now an independent Standards Development Organization (SDO) though it continues to work with the FAA using nearly the same RTCA committee structure it has for years. The group will also continue working with EUROCAE, its European counterpart, to develop joint standards.

"Mindful of the FAA's desire to continue without interruption, the production of high-quality standards and guidance materials, RTCA is committed to a seamless transition," saidRTCA President Margaret Jenny in a prepared statement.

Indeed, most everything will continue as it has before and aviation officials will still be represented at the meetings.

"The FAA will still request standards from us," Jenny told Inside GNSS. "They've still indicated that they will be invoking them as a means of compliance. So the thing that changes is that where we would have had a government person on every committee called a designated federal official - that's required for a federal advisory committee - they would just become more of a liaison to the committees. Their intention is to stay involved so that part really doesn't change."

One distinct change is that the Drone Advisory Committee and the NextGen Advisory Committee will be managed by the FAA, at least until a contractor can be found to handle day-to-day operations - a contractor that could potentially be RTCA.

"The NACand DAC have new charters as stand-alone FACs," the FAA said in a statement sent to Inside GNSS."They are identical and intact as they are today.They will still be administered by RTCA or another vendor.They will be working on the same issues.All the benefits of these two advisory councils are still in place and valued."

Given the effort to maintain stability it is not entirely clear what prompted FAA to drop its advisory committee arrangement with RTCA, which has been in place since 1976. Two sources who requested anonymity to be able to discuss the matter believed that it was fueled by a desire within the administration to cut the total number of advisory committees.

"What we were told is that the Department of Transportation was doing a thorough review of all their federal advisory committees to determine whether they needed to stay in place," Jenny said. "When they looked at RTCA, we are a little bit unique in that we are a utilized Federal Advisory Committee and all we were told was they determined that they would prefer to have it run by the FAA as opposed to an outside entity."

A utilized advisory committee is where an organization outside of government runs the FAC.

The shift is entirely not without potential consequences. It may cause something of a delay in the work of both the Drone and NextGen groups. The FAA cannot issue new tasking statements for the two groups until 15 days after Federal Register notice of the new groups being chartered (launched). The notices for each group appeared May 31.

Though the shift may be causing some confusion the next meetings for the two panels are supposed to proceed on the same day though there might be changes in location. The FAA will advise committee members.

There is at least one other potential consequence as well. RTCA, as a more independent body, will now be able to work on standards at the behest of industry. In fact industry-requested standards could be an opportunity for RTCA to grow, Jenny said.

"So we could do those kinds of things without FAA requests," she said. "We would just make sure that, number one, they (they requestors) had multiple companies and number two, anything we do as a standards organization will be compliant with all U.S. antitrust laws."

If industry did seek a standard there likely would still be FAA involvement, she said.

"We would typically talk to the FAA about whether they would invoke it," Jenny explained, "and then we would make a decision with our industry members on whether we felt we should go ahead and start a voluntary standard that they would use for compliance or use, basically, to make sure that they're building according to the standards."

Wake Turbulence

The European Aviation Safety Agency has published safety information bulletin SIB 2017-10 to remind pilots and air traffic controllers about the risks associated with wake turbulence encounters at high altitude and applicable precautionary measures. “With the increase in overall volume of air traffic and enhanced navigation precision, wake turbulence encounters in the en route phase of flight have progressively become more frequent in the last few years,” the bulletin said.

The document comes just six months after a Bombardier Challenger 604 at FL340 was severely damaged and its occupants injured when it encountered wake turbulence 12 nm from an Airbus 380 that had passed overhead in the opposite direction at FL350. As the bulletin noted, the so-called “heavy” and “super heavy” aircraft—such as the Airbus 340 and 380 and Boeing 747—are more prone to generate stronger vortices, although there is also potential from other large aircraft types.

Considering the high operating airspeeds in cruise and the standard 1,000-foot vertical separation in RVSM airspace, EASA said that wake can be encountered up to 25 nm behind the generating airplane, but “the most significant encounters are reported within a distance of 15 nm.” The bulletin concludes with illustrations that show various scenarios of wake turbulence encounters and recommended avoidance techniques.


EASA says airlines' tech ban may compromise safety

Europe's aviation regulator voiced concern on Wednesday over the risk of battery fires in the cargo holds of passenger planes after U.S. and British authorities banned certain electronics from passenger cabins despite U.S. assurances that its agency had been thoroughly briefed on the proper handling of electronics.

The European Aviation Safety Agency, which is responsible for safe flying in 32 countries, said personal electronic devices (PED) carried a fire risk due to their lithium batteries and should preferably be carried inside passenger cabins so that any problems could be identified and dealt with.

In regard to the European agency's concerns, the U.S. Transportation Safety Administration said it had "coordinated closely with the FAA" (Federal Aviation Administration) on the logistics of the ban and that the agency had provided information to airlines regarding appropriate handling of electronics and lithium batteries.

The European agency, however, warned in a bulletin: "When the carriage of PEDs in the cabin is not allowed, it leads to a significant increase of the number of PEDs in the cargo compartment. Certain precautions should therefore be observed to mitigate the risk of accidental fire in the cargo hold."

Computers in checked baggage must be completely switched off and "well protected from accidental activation," it added.

The Cologne, Germany-based agency issued its guidance two weeks after the United States and Britain banned gadgets larger than a smartphone from passenger cabins on flights from certain countries because of security concerns.

The European safety recommendation is not mandatory, but is likely to rekindle a debate about the new rules, which some airline chiefs have criticized as inconsistent or ineffective.

A group representing 38,000 European pilots said last week it was "seriously concerned" about the ban, on the grounds that it could create new safety risks.

"With current airplane cargo hold fire suppression systems, it might prove to be impossible to extinguish a lithium battery fire in the cargo hold, especially when the batteries are stored together. Therefore, any event of this nature during flight would more than likely be catastrophic," the European Cockpit Association said.

It is not the first time regulators have called for personal devices to be carried in the cabin, but possibly the first time such measures have clashed so directly with security considerations.

In 2015, international regulators urged airlines to transport lithium-powered hoverboards in the cabin following reports of the popular devices catching fire. Several airlines went even further and banned them altogether, but travel experts say such a draconian ban on computers would carry little support from the industry or its lucrative business travelers.


Security experts say the decision to place electronics into checked bags on U.S.-bound flights from eight Middle East or North African countries suggests Washington has intelligence that enough material can now be packed into a laptop, usually disguised as its battery, to cause catastrophic damage.

Placing such objects in checked baggage would expose them to greater screening for explosives and reduce the chances that a hidden bomb could be deliberately placed next to the cabin wall.

France has been studying whether and how to apply similar restrictions on cabin baggage, security sources say.

Last year, a suspected suicide bomber tried to blow up a Somali jetliner as it was taking off from Mogadishu by placing a computer bomb near the window. He was sucked out of the jet without causing it to crash, but the incident focused attention on the threat of bombs hidden inside ordinary-looking gadgets.

Reuters last month reported that the rules banning many items from passenger cabins on U.S.- and Britain-bound flights would, however, force a rethink on fire safety concerns now that they were being consigned to the hold.

EASA's warning highlights the struggle to juggle rules on safety with increasingly stringent security protections and the wider risk that rules to solve one problem can lead to another.

FACT BOX European guidelines on carrying computers on airplanes
The FAA says such "unintended effects" are one of the common themes it has identified in its database on lessons learned from past crashes.

"The recent laptop ban on certain routes to the USA has brought into sharp relief exactly this challenge," said UK-based aviation consultant John Strickland.

"Simply taking items powered by lithium batteries and stashing them in the hold is not an option unless done with sufficient attention to safety," he added.

Safety regulators have focused for years on the growing headache caused by temperamental lithium-ion batteries.

In 2015, the FAA told airlines not to let passengers pack extra lithium-ion batteries inside their checked baggage.

Airlines had already been alerted to the risk of carrying large shipments of lithium batteries as cargo after a UPS Boeing 747 cargo jet crashed in 2010, killing both crew.

But current FAA advice suggests it has fewer concerns than its European counterpart about the threat of fires from batteries already installed in individual passenger's devices.

Integrating SMSs: Dutch safety probe urges more collaboration

An investigation by Dutch aviation safety officials found that all aviation stakeholders need to work closer together to maintain high safety levels at the international airport.

While it found no evidence to suggest that safety at Schiphol is inadequate, the investigation did reveal a number of safety risks that need to be tackled and Michiel van Dorst, chief executive of Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (LVNL), said the recommendations are in line with a number of initiatives already started by the air navigation service provider.

He cited the training of air traffic controllers and the development of systems that, for example, give the air traffic controller in the tower an additional warning when an aircraft makes a go-around.

In the current situation, aviation stakeholders each have their own certified safety management system. The Dutch Safety Board advised better cooperation between the parties from these sectors, with the Schiphol Safety Platform having an important role in this regard. LVNL said it embraced this recommendation and, together with KLM and Schiphol Group, has already begun investigating the advantages of a coordinating, integrated safety system.

"This would put Schiphol in the lead worldwide," said Van Dorst. "You need to keep looking at your own organisation, but also at how you can be more effective together. Aviation is the safest form of travel. This is a status we must keep earning. That is why this report contributes so much, in our opinion."

The Dutch Safety Board also noted that further growth of Schiphol will require more than marginal adjustments to the existing policy."This calls for a fundamental debate on the future of aviation in the Netherlands and on the options and limitations regarding Schiphol's further growth," it said.

In a statement, Dutch flag carrier KLM called the DSB report 'beneficial'. "Safety is our top priority. For this reason, KLM has implemented a progressive, state-of-the-art safety management system. All operational choices made at KLM are assessed within this system, thereby ensuring that safety is our priority under all circumstances."

"KLM shares the opinion of the DSB that safety at and around Schiphol of a high standard. KLM feels that the recommendations issued by the DSB provide a firm foundation for further improvement of the safety management system. KLM will closely scrutinise the study and looks forward to working with Air Traffic Control the Netherlands and Amsterdam Airport Schiphol to further improve safety standards."

The Dutch State has final responsibility for the integral safety of air traffic at and around the airport.

EASA aims to fine-tune safety-risk analysis


Forty years after the worst accident in civil aviation history, European authorities are transitioning to a new method of assessing safety risk.

Safety performance has typically been monitored through the blunt tool of counting accidents and serious incidents.

But the European Aviation Safety Agency states that this method is "not a good risk measure".

In a preliminary safety review covering 2016 the authority says the accident rate of European-operated commercial air transport has been broadly downwards since 2012, to around three per million flights.

The overall number of accidents last year, 18, was the lowest figure for a decade but, in contrast, the number of serious incidents, more than 100, was the highest in the same period.

"This increase was mainly attributable to occurrences relating to technical failures of aircraft systems, medical, runway excursion and loss of separation," says EASA.

EASA says a new common risk-classification scheme due for implementation this year will "provide a better picture" of safety risks.

The scheme emerged from a European Union directive requiring development, by May 2017, of a mechanism by which necessary rapid action could be identified through analysis of individual safety occurrences.

"Such a scheme should help the relevant entities in their assessment of occurrences and in determining where best to focus their efforts," the directive states.

IATA states that the commercial airline industry's accident rate declined to 1.61 per million flights last year, from the previous level of 1.79.

It released its accident statistics days before the 40th anniversary of the Boeing 747 runway collision in Tenerife in March 1977, which resulted in over 580 fatalities and remains the highest-casualty accident in civil aviation history.

The major jet accident rate increased slightly to 0.39, one of the parameters in which the association acknowledges the industry took a "step back".

But the relative rarity of accidents means that the statistics are easily skewed by individual occurrences, highlighting the need for a more finely-tuned method of analysis.

The European scheme is intended to collate occurrence reports in a format which will facilitate information exchange.

EASA says: "The scheme will help to shift the focus to the probable potential harm of identified hazards to the European aviation system instead of directly measuring the severity of a realised outcome."

Aviation industry in standoff over making 'black boxes' deployable and able to share data faster

Two possible technology updates are deployable recorders, with transmitters for easier location from crash sites, and streaming data devices

A Malay couple watch Malaysia Airlines aircraft at Kuala Lumpur International airport on Jan. 23. Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 went missing in March 2014 while traveling from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing with 239 passengers aboard.


Three years after Malaysia Airlines Flight 370's unresolved disappearance sparked efforts to implement new flight-data recorder technology, the global aviation community is deadlocked over the best way to ensure investigators will have timely access to vital clues in future crashes.

Technical, marketing and jurisdictional disputes-pitting Boeing Co. and U.S. regulators against Airbus Group SE and European authorities-have blocked consensus over prospective changes to today's "black boxes" that help unravel accidents.

The most prominent disagreement involves "deployable" recorders, devices designed to capture real-time flight data and cockpit conversations, just as damage-resistant black-box recorders do.

But while conventional black boxes are intended to be recovered from wreckage, the alternative devices, already used in a broad range of military jets and helicopters world-wide, are designed to be jettisoned automatically prior to impact and to float.

Airbus AIR, -0.14% and other proponents say that supplementing current systems with deployable technology would lead to easier searches, with features including built-in emergency transmitters that can pinpoint locations on the surface of water.

In the opposing camp, Boeing's BA, -0.12% position is that the deployable technology is unnecessary partly because there are so few crashes of big jets, and the recorders are expensive to maintain and potentially hazardous if ejected by mistake. The disagreement has played out in various forums, both in public and private. Federal Aviation Administration officials say it is hard to justify the costs of deployable recorders versus the safety benefits.


EASA rulemaking task (RMT.0049) on CS25.1309

Design improvements may limit the probability of technical failures. With 45 % of fatal accidents involving some sort of technical failures during the past 10 years, this is both a major accident outcome and a precursor of other types of accident.  This statement is coming from EASA's Annual Safety Review 2016. It does not necessarily mean that the technical failure was the direct cause of the accidents, but that a system component failure was identified in the sequence of events of 1 of the 5 fatal accidents in CAT Aeroplanes during the past 10 years (out of a total of 11). This could be an engine failure, an avionics system failure or some other recoverable technical failure. The cause of the accident is usually the result of a combination of circumstances and events that can only be understood after reading the investigation report.

Specific analysis work is ongoing to identify the systemic safety issues that may be present in the domains of airworthiness, maintenance and production. Non-accident data will be used for the analysis

RMT.0049:   Specific risk and standardised criteria for conducting aeroplane-level safety assessments of critical systems
To define a standardised criterion for conducting aeroplane-level safety assessment of specific risks that encompasses all critical aeroplane systems on large aeroplanes (i.e. in particular update AMC to CS 25.1309), based on the results of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Airplane-level Safety Analysis Working Group (ASAWG).
In addition, to amend AMC 25.1309 taking into account the latest updates of industry documents, such as ED79A/ARP4754A.
To update CS 25.671 on safety assessment of flight control systems, based on the results of the ARAC Flight Controls Harmonisation Working Group (FCHWG).
For both objectives, harmonisation with the FAA, the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) and Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC) will be ensured as much as possible.

A decision is expected during Q4 of 2018. See NPA for more details:


NPA 2016-15: Instructions for continued airworthiness: certification maintenance requirements


This NPA proposes amendments to CS 25.1309, CS-25 Appendix H, and AMC 25-19 in order to improve the guidance material in relation to CMRs.

EASA to update CS25.1309

To define a standardised criterion for conducting aeroplane-level safety assessment of specific risks that encompasses all critical aeroplane systems on large aeroplanes (i.e. in particular update AMC to CS 25.1309), based on the results of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Airplane-level Safety Analysis Working Group (ASAWG).
In addition, to amend AMC 25.1309 taking into account the latest updates of industry documents, such as ED79A/ARP4754A.
To update CS 25.671 on safety assessment of flight control systems, based on the results of the ARAC Flight Controls Harmonisation Working Group (FCHWG).
For both objectives, harmonisation with the FAA, the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) and Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC) will be ensured as much as possible.
Affected stakeholders:  DAHs
Start: 2010
Next deliverable: CRD/2017

BREXIT: The impacts on the aviation regulatory regime
Pitot Tube problems receiving ongoing scrutiny

Pitot probe vulnerability is again receiving scrutiny from regulators following detailed reports on two inflight emergencies traced back to the systems.

The first, involving a United Airlines Boeing 757 descending into Dublin in October 2013, was chronicled in a recent issue of this magazine (AW&ST May 23, p. 32). The report by Irish investigators cited two probable causes: A temporary blockage of the right main pitot tube due to icing, leading to an inaccurate low-airspeed indication on the first officer's display and the crew's non-standard response to the low-airspeed reading. The Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit's report included eight recommendations, including for the FAA to "study whether a safety deficiency exists in pitot probe icing protection" for aircraft certified before January 2015, when enhanced certification standards went into effect. Those changes were triggered in part by the investigation into the June 2009 Air France Flight 447 accident, which determined that inconsistent airspeed readings between the captain's and first officer's displays started the chain of events that led to an aerodynamic stall.

A month after the United incident, industrious mud-dauber wasps took less than 3 hr. to build a nest in the pilot's-side pitot probe of an Etihad Airways Airbus A330 on the ground at Brisbane Airport in Australia, triggering a series of troubling events, an Australian investigation found. The undetected blockage of mud resulted in an aborted takeoff that was followed by an inconclusive troubleshooting effort by maintenance technicians and a second takeoff for Singapore. That departure was quickly followed by a Mayday call by the pilots, who promptly returned to Brisbane. Several organizations affected by the incident instituted changes based on the investigation, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau's (ATSB) report explained. The airport instituted multiple operational changes, Airbus modified its maintenance troubleshooting manual, and Etihad began requiring ground crews to install pitot probe covers at Brisbane "irrespective of ground time."

Investigators determined that the nest blocked the captain's pitot tube, resulting in a red "speed flag" display on the avionics as the aircraft accelerated through 50 kt. on the first takeoff attempt. Per standard operating procedures (SOP), the captain rejected the takeoff. The A330 has three open-face pitot tubes-a captain's probe, first officer's probe and standby probe-on the underside of the fuselage near the nose, devices that measure ram air pressure that is converted to airspeed readings by the avionics.

Maintenance technicians relied on two procedures in the A330 troubleshooting manual (TSM), neither of which identified the pitot probe as a possible root cause for the airspeed indication problem. The ATSB noted that Airbus had sent out a service letter to operators prior to the incident, linking airspeed discrepancies to potential pitot probe problems. The airframer in October 2014 updated the TSM to include the additional information.

The A330 was cleared for departure after a few minor avionics configuration changes, but the captain's airspeed indicator again failed during the takeoff run, this time at a speed where SOPs called for continuing the takeoff. The ATSB questioned the captain's recollection that the airspeed failed after "V1" (151 kt.), the speed at which crews are advised to continue the takeoff, noting that the flight data recorder information showed that the failure flag should have appeared after reaching 50 kt.

Once airborne, the sensor issues caused the A330's fly-by-wire flight control logic to revert to alternate law and various slat and flap warnings occurred. The pilots declared an emergency and landed at Brisbane at an aircraft weight of approximately 200 metric tons, 18 heavier than the A330s 182-metric-ton maximum landing weight.

UAV: New system helps aircraft automatically avoid mid-air collisions

A research effort associated with DARPA's Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System (ALIAS) program recently conducted the first successful flight tests of a shoebox-sized, plug-and-play system designed to enable manned and unmanned aircraft to automatically detect and avoid potential mid-air collisions. An unmanned air vehicle (UAV) repeatedly used the technology demonstration system to detect and track in real time a Cessna 172G aircraft approaching from various vertical and horizontal distances.

See image here

See video here.

An unmanned air vehicle (UAV) repeatedly used the technology demonstration system to detect and track in real time a Cessna 172G aircraft approaching from various vertical and horizontal distances.

The integrated sense-and-avoid (SAA) system includes a single optical camera that provides imagery for detection and tracking. The system also incorporates passive ranging features that assess the likelihood of an incoming aircraft intersecting the flight path of its host aircraft, and collision-avoidance capabilities to determine the best way to steer the host aircraft out of harm's way.

The work is part of a DARPA effort to create a low-cost, easily installed system to detect oncoming or crossing aircraft and determine the best avoidance strategy compliant with standard rules that set minimum vertical and lateral distances between aircraft during flight.

"This successful flight test is a step toward adding external perception to ALIAS' toolkit for advancing in-flight automation," Dan Patt, "What pilot wouldn't want to set a box on their dashboard that would provide an additional pair of eyes to alert of potential collisions? This SAA system has the potential to enable a wide range of manned and unmanned systems to safely integrate into an increasingly populated and complex airspace."

DARPA has been developing this capability over the past two years and put the technology demonstration system through extensive preliminary testing before the recent flight tests, which evaluated only detection and tracking. Based on the success of those flights, DARPA is planning another phase of the effort, which includes joint funding from the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).

This follow-on research would shrink the system size; further test the ranging and collision-avoidance features; mature additional capabilities of the system such as detecting aircraft below the horizon and in poor light conditions; and improve calculations for optimal aircraft trajectories to avert impending collision.

The system could ultimately serve as a line of defense in future layered air-traffic management systems that could include Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders and ground-based radar systems that are part of the federal NextGen effort. There is particular potential applicability for unmanned air systems or aircraft with reduced crew sizes.

The ALIAS program envisions a tailorable, drop-in, removable kit that would enable high levels of automation in existing aircraft and facilitate reduced need for onboard crew.

The program intends to leverage the considerable advances that have been made in aircraft automation systems over the past 50 years, as well as the advances that have been made in remotely piloted aircraft technologies, to help shift and refocus pilot workloads, augment mission performance and improve aircraft safety.

Boeing, FAA warn 787 pilots of bad airspeed data

Boeing 787 pilots are being warned not to make sudden control inputs in response to a "sudden, unrealistic" drop in airspeed shown on cockpit displays.

The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will adopt an airworthiness directive on 1 April requiring 787-8 and 787-9 operators to update the flight manual with the warning message.

The FAA accelerated the release of the airworthiness directive, bypassing the normal rulemaking process to make operators adopt the change as quickly as possible.

Boeing made an identical recommendation to 787 operators on 4 March, which the FAA directive will make mandatory.

The fleet has made three reports of displayed airspeed plunging significantly below actual airspeed, the FAA says. In each case, the 787 was flying in conditions involving significant water ingestion and possibly icing of two of the three pitot tubes feeding speed and altitude information to the air data system.

The FAA and Boeing are continuing to investigate the cause of the erroneous displayed speed changes.

In one case, the pilot reacted to the inaccurate data by commanding a "significant" nose-down dive, over-riding the auto-pilot in the process.

Boeing and the FAA are concerned that a pilot might command a dive that exceeds the structural limits of the 787, as a response to erroneous information from the air data system.

While the cause of the erroneous data is being investigated, 787 operators must update the manual to instruct pilots to not apply "large, abrupt control column inputs" in response to an "unrealistic" drop in displayed airspeed.

See also

Europe needs own aircraft threat warning system - task force

European aviation safety authorities have recommended that Europe set up its own system for publishing information on conflict zones for airlines, citing limits in the usefulness of a global repository already in place.

The United Nations' aviation arm, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), set up a conflict zones website after the 2014 downing of a Malaysian passenger jet over an area of fighting in Ukraine.

But the website, which allows states to share information about risks to flight routes, has come under fire for taking too long to post advisory warnings and ICAO is now reviewing the site.





A European task force including representatives from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Commission and the International Air Transport Association said on Thursday the ICAO website had two main restrictions - the length of time it took advisories to be published and the fact that risk assessments were too isolated in nature because they were the product of one state.

"(This has) created a need for an alternate information sharing and distribution process taking place at European level," the task force said in its report.

The task force recommended developing a common European risk assessment of conflict zones and a quick alert mechanism to notify the aviation community, and called on European countries to share information on conflict zones.

EU Transport Commissioner Violeta Bulc said the threat of terrorism to civil aviation was likely to remain high in the foreseeable future.

"Time for action is now - it is essential that ‎concrete steps are put in place to protect EU citizens when flying," she said in a statement.

The ICAO did not immediately comment.

ICAO unveils new rules to prevent future aircraft disappearances

New rules have been made public on the anniversary of the loss of MH370 that are intended to prevent any future aircraft disappearances from happening. The ICAO Council adopted new rules to prevent the loss of aircraft that run into distress in very remote locations. These new rules will be amendments to Annex 6 of the Chicago Convention covering the operation of aircraft.

There are three primary new rules and they will take effect between now and 2021. The rules include a requirement for aircraft to carry autonomous distress tracking devices that are capable of sending autonomous transmit location information at least once per minute in a distress circumstance. Another new provision has a requirement for aircraft to be equipped with means to have flight recorder data recovered and made available in a timely manner. The new rules also outline an increase in the duration of the cockpit recorder voice recordings to 25 hours to cover all phases of flight for all types of operations.

"These developments are consistent with the findings and recommendations of the multidisciplinary
Ad-Hoc Working Group ICAO formed after Malaysia Airlines MH370 went missing in May 2014," commented Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu, ICAO Council President. "They directly support the concept of operations for the Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System (GADSS) which was proposed by ICAO at that time, and will now greatly contribute to aviation's ability to ensure that similar disappearances never occur again."

The new rules covering the one-minute distress tracking and extended flight data recordings are performance-based. This allows the aircraft operators to consider all available and emerging technologies to meet the criteria. The provisions are meant to ensure that in the case of an aircraft accident, the crash site will be known immediately to within six nautical miles.


Pilots not to blame for fatal Bell-Boeing V-22 crash, Pentagon says

FORT WORTH, Texas - For more than a decade, the wives of Marine Corps pilots Maj. Brooks Gruber and Lt. Col. John Brow have sought to clear the names of their late husbands, who were blamed for the crash of a MV-22 Osprey in the Arizona desert in April 2000 that killed them and 17 others.

According to a report by Stars and Stripes, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work wrote that after a review of all the investigations and reports on the crash, "I disagree with the characterization that the pilots' drive to accomplish the mission was 'the fatal factor' in the crash."

He said that while human factors contributed to the accident, other events leading up to fatal flight made the event "probable, or perhaps inevitable."

"It is clear that there were deficiencies in the V-22's development and engineering and safety programs that were corrected only after the crash - and these deficiencies likely contributed to the accident and its fatal outcome. I therefore conclude it is impossible to point to a single 'fatal factor' that caused this crash," Work wrote, according to the report.

Following the tragic accident during a night combat test flight, a Marine investigation found that a "combination of human factors" - interpreted as pilot error - was the primary cause of the crash.
At the time, the V-22 - manufactured by Fort Worth-based Bell Helicopter and Boeing - was a program under fire. In development since 1981, at a cost approaching $15 billion, pressure was mounting for the military to move forward with operational testing of the novel tilt-rotor aircraft, which could take off like a helicopter and fly like an airplane.

But the aircraft was still in the experimental phase, and pilots were struggling to understand how it reacted in certain situations, such as high-speed descents.

According to Fort Worth Star-Telegram reports, the V-22 piloted by Brow and Gruber made a steep descent that night before rolling uncontrollably to the right and slamming into the ground upside down.
In 2011, Lt. Col. James Schafer, who was piloting another V-22 in the test flight operation that night, said the accident was the result of too much pressure from the Marines and others who were trying to get the Osprey into production.

"The program was pushed too hard," Schafer told the Star-Telegram. "The best Marine Corps pilots we had became overwhelmed with the push."

The V-22 program survived. Bell-Boeing went on to deliver some 230 V-22s, assembled in Amarillo, to the U.S. military. It has been deployed in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Air Cargo Industry Still Fighting Fuel System AD

John Croft   |   Aviation Week & Space Technology,

Major cargo airlines and the industry advocacy group Airlines for America (A4A) are fighting to derail an impending series of FAA airworthiness directives (AD), the first of which is set to be published in late March. That directive will mandate Boeing 757 freighter fuel system modifications to prevent potential explosions, and announcements for other aircraft models will follow.

The proposed 757 rule will require cargo airlines—within 6 years—to separate wires used by the 757’s fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) to measure the amount of fuel in the aircraft’s center fuel tank. The FAA wants the wires that run between the FQIS processor and the center fuel tank, as well as other wires that pass through a main fuel tank, to be separated by 2 in. to prevent a short circuit that could travel into the tank and cause a spark.

The NTSB determined that such a scenario—an external short circuit that propagated into a fuel tank through FQIS wires—is the most likely explanation for the downing of TWA Flight 800, a Boeing 747-100, in the Atlantic Ocean in 1996. The 757 wiring directive is the latest in a long list of responses to the crash: In addition to dozens of ADs aimed at safing fuel tank components for several aircraft types, the FAA in 2001 issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, requiring airframers to reanalyze the design of fuel tank systems, and in 2008 the agency finalized a rule requiring passenger airliners to have fuel tank inerting systems by the end of 2017 to mitigate the threat. But all-cargo aircraft were exempt from the 2008 rule.

UPS, FedEx and Atlas Air met with the FAA in December to convince the agency to cancel an impending Boeing 757 freighter directive. Credit: UPS

A4A says the cargo carriers have already spent “tens of millions” of dollars over the past 20 years in fuel tank safety improvements, and that the new rule did not account for nearly $36 million in upgrades that the airlines spent for SFAR 88 and other post-TWA 800 changes, including 55 ADs and wiring maintenance program improvements. “There have been no incidents since [these changes] were implemented,” A4A said in a meeting with the FAA in December. “This provides direct evidence that FAA projections for additional incidents was overstated and that SFAR 88 changes have worked.” A4A also says the costs—which it estimates at $16 million for UPS alone if other Boeing models are eventually included—will make U.S. cargo operators less competitive in the global marketplace as no other countries are requiring the upgrades.

SMS Reconsidered

By William R. Voss, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation

I don’t write about safety management systems (SMSs) much because everybody else seems to be getting “burned out” on the subject. Back when the international standards for SMS were signed out at ICAO, we all knew we were going to launch a new industry full of consultants. We also knew that all these consultants couldn’t possibly know much about the subject and would be forced to regurgitate the ICAO guidance material that was being put out. It was obvious that the process people dealing with ISO and QMS would embrace the concept of SMS and treat it as another process exercise. It was also clear that regulators were going to have a very hard time evaluating an SMS and would be forced to reduce the concept to a series of checklists.

All of those predictions have come true, so it is time to take an honest look at where we are and where we go from here. The ICAO guidance was built around the “four pillars,” so now everybody has an SMS with four pillars. And of course, now every regulator has a checklist that counts the pillars. We all have policies, posters, forms, processes and meetings. This is all really very comforting to people who have never grasped the concept of risk management. They are reassured by the fact that all they really have to do is fill out the right form and show up at the weekly meeting. Many well-meaning operators have worked themselves into a position where they are spending lots of time and money, but are not necessarily getting the intended results. Many managers have figured this out, and thankfully a few of them have come to us. We are learning a lot from these operators and, as a result, the Foundation is now trying to drive SMS back to its core principles

Before SMS was made complex by the consultants and process people, it was meant to do one simple thing — allocate resources against risk. I would suggest that we measure that instead of counting our meetings and posters. Please put away the checklist and try this approach instead. Go back to last year’s budget, and see if you can find one single instance where information from your SMS caused you to spend money differently than you had planned. If you cannot find an example of that in your operation, you either have an extraordinarily brilliant budgeting process, or an SMS that is not delivering. I would bet on the latter.

If you want to go deeper, let me give you four simple audit questions that are really easy to answer if you have an effective SMS, and impossible to answer if you don’t:
1.What is most likely to be the cause of your next accident or serious incident?
2.How do you know that?
3.What are you doing about it?
4.Is it working?

The easiest way to make people do silly things is to measure them against mindless objectives. I think SMS was always a serious and practical idea. It is supposed to change the way you manage risk. Find a way to measure those changes, and you will find a way to drive an effective implementation.

Risks From In-Flight Pilot Error Persist

Tegel Airport in Berlin. The Eurocontrol study examined data from 800 incidents in European airspace last year.


Pilots responding improperly to midair-collision alarms pose one of the top safety risks for airline passengers across Europe, according to studies by the regional authority that show little improvement in addressing the danger.

One-quarter of cockpit crews who received such computer-generated emergency warnings failed to take the correct evasive action, according to data from some 800 incidents in European airspace last year.

Reacting to such commands, which typically pop up less than 30 seconds before a possible collision, roughly 8% of pilots did the opposite of what the technology commanded, such as pulling the plane up when the alert told them to push it down. Another 17% climbed or descended too slowly or too quickly, according to analyses by Eurocontrol, which handles and coordinates European air traffic.

Individual airlines and locations weren't disclosed, but all the events occurred outside airport radar coverage.

Improper pilot responses rose to 36% for follow-up alerts, according to Tzvetomir Blajev, the Eurocontrol official who headed the study. Results from previous years were comparable.

None of the close calls analyzed led to accidents, but "the number of improper responses is concerning," Mr. Blajev said in an interview. "We are looking for more information to start safety-improvement actions."

Findings from recent studies in the U.S. or elsewhere haven't been disseminated, so it isn't possible to compare regions. Based on historical data buttressed by recent but limited anecdotal information, some safety experts estimate the error rate to be comparable.

Business jets also are equipped with comparable warning systems, but the performance level of those pilots is even less clear.

In a separate, detailed analysis of dozens of the most serious European midair close calls in 2014, Eurocontrol concluded that only sheer luck prevented two from ending in tragedy.

"The normal safety barriers broke down completely" partly due to pilots' failures to respond properly, according to Mr. Blajev, who directs the agency's safety-improvement initiatives.

Further efforts are under way to determine factors influencing cockpit reactions, he said.

Some independent safety experts believe pilot complacency and undue reliance on cockpit automation are major reasons behind the slip-ups. "When something really goes wrong, crews may not be ready to respond emotionally, or otherwise," according to consultant Robert Matthews, a former U.S. Federal Aviation Administration safety analyst.

The rate of pilot errors in avoiding potential midair collisions in Europe was disclosed at an international safety conference in Miami Beach in November.

The Eurocontrol study was based on data drawn from just 13 radar facilities, a small portion of those in the 42 countries whose airspace Eurocontrol handles or coordinates. It involved an average of 120 incidents each month, indicating that such incidents likely occur thousands of times each year throughout Europe.

A spokesman for the European Aviation Safety Agency, the region's safety regulator, didn't have any immediate comment.

Years before the Eurocontrol study, Airbus Group SE opted to equip its A380 and A350 jets with technology to automatically put the planes into the appropriate climb or descent trajectory, without any pilot action. The company incorporated the technology partly out of concern that pilots would react too slowly or otherwise incorrectly to warnings. Crews are trained to respond within a few seconds.

Current collision-avoidance systems, called TCAS or ACAS, have dramatically reduced the specter of midair crashes world-wide.

When onboard computers determine two aircraft are on a potential collision course, they issue a general warning followed by a more urgent and specific alert called a resolution advisory. That shows up on the instrument panel, typically depicting the other plane in red and instructing pilots to immediately climb or descend.

The start and duration of such advisories depends on variables including altitude, closing speed and pilot reactions. Computers on opposing planes communicate with each other during maneuvers and can adjust the warnings they issue, with the goal of ensuring pilots maintain a safe vertical separation of at least 300 feet. Pilots are informed once the danger passes.

The automated commands "should always be followed precisely by flight crews, that's the firm policy of Eurocontrol," according to Mr. Blajev.

In the U.S., pilots and regulators say aviators have somewhat greater leeway to adjust responses, based on their judgment, specifics of the situation and whether crews are able to clearly see the other plane or know its intentions.

Yet the systems aren't foolproof, because equipment failures or pilot mistakes have resulted in several high-profile tragedies since the 1990s. One of the most dramatic crashes occurred in 2002 over European airspace, when a DHL Inc. cargo jet collided with a Russian-built charter plane carrying dozens of teenage tourists, resulting in 71 fatalities.

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