News Archive

Date	Title	News	Link
12/19/2006	Airbus urged to fix A320's electrics	Airbus has received four recommendations for modifications to its A320 series electrical systems following an incident in which an A319 crew lost voice communications and all the captain's electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) displays. In the absence of these systems the crew had to use the emergency undercarriage deployment system to prepare for landing. The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), looking into a previous incident, found extensive electrical malfunctions had occurred five times previously. The first event the AAIB investigated occurred in October 2005 when a British Airways A319 crew lost both pilots' primary flight displays (PFD) and navigation displays (ND), plus the upper of two electronic centralised aircraft monitor (ECAM) screens. The crew also lost all cockpit lighting and communications, and were left with only one operating ECAM. However, prompt use of the ECAM checklist quickly regained many of the lost services. Now the AAIB, reporting on a 15 September EasyJet A319 flight from Alicante in Spain to Bristol in the UK, says the crew lost fewer services but, unlike the BA crew, could not regain any of them. The EasyJet problems were caused when an internal fault in the No 1 generator control unit (GCU) was interpreted by its monitoring system as an external fault in the No 1 generator line contactor, resulting in automatic isolation of one of the two main AC busbars. The event happened in the cruise near Nantes, France. Before take-off, the No 1 engine-driven generator (EDG) had been selected off because of a fault, so the crew were operating with the No 2 EDG, plus the auxiliary power unit (APU) generator. The effect of the GCU fault was to open the No 1 bus tie connector automatically, which disconnected the APU generator supply from the No 1 main AC busbar that feeds the No 1 DC busbar. This blacked out the captain's EFIS and multipurpose control and display unit, the upper ECAM display, disconnected the autopilot and autothrust, switched off the caption and integral illumination lights on the overhead panel and some on the centre pedestal, and caused the flight control law to change from normal to alternate, says the AAIB. The captain, who was flying, had only the standby instruments operating on his side, so he handed control to the co-pilot, whose PFD and ND were operating. He tried to transmit a Mayday call, but none of the radios worked and the main transponder was not powered. By carrying out the ECAM checklist, the captain successfully powered up the alternate transponder and entered the 7700 emergency code. He continued as flight-planned to Bristol, where the aircraft landed safely following deployment of the landing gear using the emergency system.
12/9/2006	IET announces conference on Safety Integrity Levels	Following on from the highly successful 2006 seminar on SIL Determination, the IET is pleased to announce this third seminar in the SIL Determination series. With industry relying more and more upon computer based safety-related systems to achieve tolerable levels of risk, IEC 61508 and other standards in this series (e.g. IEC 61511 and IEC 62061) are increasingly being used to achieve the required functional safety. A key requirement of these standards is the determination of the Safety Integrity Level for each safety function. The concept of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is fundamental in ensuring a safety-related system satisfactorily performs the required safety functions under all stated conditions within a defined time period. Key benefits Key concepts of SIL Determination in risk reduction strategies, IEC 61508/61511 and the safety lifecycle Methodologies in current use for SIL determination, the appropriateness of such methods and pros and cons of each Software tools and techniques designed to automate and streamline SIL Determination Who should attend? This event will be of interest to Engineers and Technical managers from organisations that: Are responsible for management of safety, health and environmental systems Specify the safety requirements and target SIL of E/E/PE safety-related systems Provide safety-related systems designed to meet the target SIL and safety requirements Are responsible for maintaining and optimising SIL performance on operational assets 28 March 2007, Savoy Place, London, UK
12/7/2006	Safety Engineer needed in Cambridge (UK)	New vacancy advert added for a safety engineer.
10/11/2006	Electronic Transmission of Passenger data	CAP 393 AIR NAVIGATION: THE ORDER AND THE REGULATIONS Amendment 3/2006 amends Section 1 of CAP 393. It comprises the Air Navigation (Amendment) Order 2006 (SI 2006/2316). This inserts a new article 141A into the Air Navigation Order 2005 which enables the Secretary of State for Transport to direct an operator of an aircraft to make data relating to passengers and crew available electronically to authorities in a country outside the European Economic Area to which the aircraft is being flown. This change came into force on 30 September 2006.
10/9/2006	Throttles-only airliner pilot training study	NASA is working with the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and United Airlines to develop guidelines for flightcrews to operate crippled aircraft using "throttles-only control". The DHS-led propulsion controlled aircraft recovery (PCAR) project revives earlier lessons learned from NASA's propulsion controlled aircraft (PCA) programme of the mid-1990s, but differs significantly in that it requires no hardware or software modifications. The original PCA concept, which emerged after the 1989 Sioux City crash in which a United McDonnell Douglas DC-10 lost all hydraulic power, led to the development of a computer-based control system to fly aircraft using engine thrust alone. The DHS has revived interest in throttles-only control of damaged or disabled aircraft following its counter-Manpads (man-portable air defence systems) studies into protecting airliners from missile attacks.

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